After the unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, many in the United States were eager to see in this victory the beginning of a “new American century” or even the “end of history”.1 The American-led West avidly filled the space where Soviet influence vanished, particularly in Eastern Europe, but one region in the world's heartland would have to wait one more decade before being courted by Washington: Central Asia.
The geopolitical power vacuum formed by the sudden independence of the five former Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia, as well as the fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan, led many scholars and political analysts to foresee the commencement of a new “Great Game”2, but this time with more players and with fossil fuels playing a central role.
This research paper will examine and analyze the interests, objectives and strategies of the main three competing powers in Central Asia: Russia, China and the United States. It will attempt to understand the growing cooperation between Russia and China and how that affects the United States. An understanding of the global extent of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership demonstrates that Central Asia is now one of the most strategically important region in the post-Cold War unipolar world and that by cooperating together, Russia and China are actually able to counter the lone superpower, the United States, announcing a coming age of multipolarity.
This analysis will use the common modern political definition of Central Asia which is limited to the states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.3 That said, it should be noted that geopolitics in Central Asia often includes secondary or peripheral state actors such as Afghanistan, Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and Mongolia. There are also some geographically linked minor powers that have new interests in Central Asia, like Turkey, who has cultural and linguistic ties to the region; Iran, who wants to regain influence in the historic backyard of the Persian Empire; or Pakistan and India, who are willing to transport their rivalry to new grounds. (Brown, Walsh 273, 282, Weitz 155)
As for the three studied powers, two of them, Russia and China, are in a way partially Central Asian states, and both have regions inhabited by Turkic-speaking minorities.4 The United States is therefore the only outside power with considerable political and economic leverage in the region.5 The emergence of competition in Central Asia unravelled as those three powers progressively increased their influence in the region and recent developments at the onset of the 21st century have brought that competition to its current critical state.
The growing American presence following September 11 and its invasion of Afghanistan brought new dynamics “which posed a direct challenge to Russia” and after years of neglect toward Central Asia by former President Yeltsin, “Russian generals demanded [new President Putin] the neutralization of America’s growing influence in the post-Soviet Union” (Buszinsky 546-8). As for China, it first saw “opportunities in the competing interests of [regional] actors” because “it hastened trends toward multipolarity” (Walsh 273-4) but then saw “the purpose of US involvement in Central Asia as to curtail Chinese presence” (Ong 433). This shared perception of an American threat has contributed to bring Russia and China much closer.
In July 2005, the presidents of Russia and China declared in a joint statement to “have joined together in a strategic partnership aimed at countering the U.S. and Western 'monopoly in world affairs'” (De Hass). Central Asia is by far the region where Russian and Chinese interests correspond the most. Since then, even if they have different or even competing goals, cooperation and policy coordination between the two powers have matured to a high level.
In addition to counter American intrusion, Russia's main political goal is to keep a wide-ranging influence in the former Soviet Republics, which it labels its “near abroad”. Moscow aims at achieving this, as Buszynski observes, with the “expansion of the Russian military presence in Central Asia” (553) and by “strengthening relations with local rulers” (560), who actually “share more goals with their Russian counterparts than they do with leaders from other parts of the world” (Olcott 333). This goal in mind, Russia has institutionalized its relations with Central Asia through several regional organizations: politically-wise with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), militarily-wise with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and economically-wise with the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) and the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) (the two which are in a process of merging together).6 Another major goal is to keep “hold over regional energy resources [and] transportation routes that will be advantageous to Russia” (Saghal). Especially to keep some level of economic and political leverage on Europe in the context of its “increasing dependence on Russia for meeting its energy needs” (Bhadrakumar, “Russian Energy”).
On China's part, the main challenge posed by the independence of mainly Turkic-speaking states was related to it's own military and political security regarding its territorial integrity. Because Uighur separatists in Xinjiang “can receive ideological support and military hardware from neighbouring Central Asian states” (Ong 429), China needed to constructively engage those states into a cooperative relationship. That is why, according to Shieves, “China's current foreign policy strategy is focused on assuaging fears of a China threat, rather than on creating situations where states in the region feel threatened or dominated by a rising China” (206). A strategy highlighted by China's “New Security Concept”, in which the “'use of force and the threat of use of force' are replaced with multilateral 'mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination'” (Atal 102).
Maybe even more important now than political security is energy security. Since 1996, China has been a net importer of crude oil, and it has tried hard to seek alternative source from the unstable Middle East (Ong 431). Central Asia is not only a major oil producing region neighbouring China, it should also produce oil for a longer time than the Middle East (Al-Sati 2). “As a result,” Weitz points out, “Chinese officials are pushing for the development of less-vulnerable, land-based oil and gas pipelines that would direct Central Asian energy resources eastward toward China” (160).
Those different and sometimes diverging goals can be a source of political competition between Russia and China. The main rivalry generator is the effort of the two powers to increase their influence on the Central Asian states, sometimes at the expense of the other. Because of its highly institutionalized integration with the region, Russia has a clear advantage. However, most experts agree that China is rapidly replacing Russia as the main Central Asian power (Atal 103, Swanström 584, Walsh 275, Weitz 158). Atal even implies that “with Chinese economic and political influence clearly eclipsing that of Russia, some Russians have expressed concern that in seeking China's help in regaining influence in its near abroad, Russia may itself become China's near abroad” (103). This fact is intensified by the contradictory interests between a western focused Russia and an eastern focused China, which is also the direction where each power wants to see Central Asian oil flowing. Weitz highlights Russia's policy dilemma by stating that some “Russians worried about China's growing influence in Central Asia also favor a counterbalancing U.S. presence in the region” (157). Still, the policy analyst is convinced that “Central Asia’s newly independent states have not become objects of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing but rather a major unifying element in Sino-Russian relations” (158).
Relations with the United States can also be a source of tension. As Bhadrakumar puts it, referring to significant American investment in China at a time when US-Russia relations are strained over the deployment of an American missile-defence system in Central Europe, “the triangular equations involving the United States, China and Russia are once again casting shadows on the Moscow-Beijing axis” (“US Shadow”).7 Both, Moscow and Beijing support the idea of a strong Sino-Russian strategic partnership to counter US power, but both have their own specific interests and distinct relationship with the United States. That is why, “given the opportunity to criticize US hegemony and its use of bases in Central Asia, China balked due to the importance of maintaining stable US-China relations during a crucial time in China's development” (Sheives 221-2).
Yet, Sheives also points out that “China has managed to incorporate its involvement in Central Asia into the Sino-Russian strategic partnership fairly easily, while it has been more of a challenge to maintain its stable relations with the US in Central Asia” (207). The reason is that, in spite of the inevitable competition, China and Russia have many converging goals, especially in the realm of security cooperation. Those two main goals are safekeeping regional political stability by battling what Beijing calls the “three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism” (Sheives 210), and using multilateral cooperation in Central Asia as a way to strengthen their bilateral relationship.
To accomplish those goals, China and Russia have institutionalized their regional cooperation by creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.8 Initially, the SCO was conceived as a forum to promote confidence-building on security issues and resolve border disputes. It has never been meant as a military alliance. However, in a very short period of time, it became much more. Not only has it achieved its initial goals, but in 2003, the SCO held its first joint military exercises, which then became a biyearly event. In 2004, the organization created the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), based in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. Now going beyond the security sphere, “the SCO speaks today about the establishment of a free-trade area and about common energy projects such as exploration of hyrdrocarbon reserves [and] joint use of hydroelectric power and water resources” (Bhadrakumar, “Great Game”). Altogether, the SCO seeks to promote “cooperation in political affairs, economy and trade, scientific-technical, cultural, and educational spheres as well as in energy, transportation, tourism, and environment protection fields” (SCO Website). Significantly, in November 2006, Russian President Putin revealed that the CSTO and the SCO would hold their first ever joint military exercise next year, (Bhadrakumar, “Orbit”), thus opening up the possibility for non-SCO CSTO members (like Armenia and Belarus) of eventually joining the SCO.
The importance of the new regional organization is unmistakable: “if observer states [...] are counted, the SCO is the largest (in terms of population and size), though not the strongest, regional group in the world” and it “remains the world's only regional security mechanism without direct US participation” (Bin). From the smaller Central Asian states' view, “China's leadership of the SCO has provided both a limited opportunity to counter Russian domination over Central Asian policy and calm Central Asian fears of China felt after their nascent, post-Soviet statehood” (Sheives 214). Therefore, by intentionally balancing out their own influence with the other into a multilateral organization, Russia and China have actually gained more than they would if they had engaged into a zero-sum unilateral competition. To quote again former Indian Ambassador to Uzbekistan, M. K. Bhadrakumar, Russia and China have succeeded into creating “their own orbit” in Central Asia (“Orbit”).
Another essential element of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is energy policy coordination. Russia is becoming an important fossil fuel exporter to the world's second highest energy consumer (Sheives 214) and its decision to “the shift in the terminus of Russia's Eastern Siberian oil and gas export pipeline from the Pacific coast to China” (Bhadrakumar, “Orbit”) has cemented this producer-consumer relationship. Also, Russia has not opposed the construction of the Sino-Kazakh “pipeline running from western Kazakhstan into Xinjiang” (Sheives 216), even if it would rather see Central Asian oil flowing toward Europe, through Russian pipelines.
Energy policy coordination even goes beyond Central Asia. In the past few years, Eurasia's biggest oil and gas producer and consumer have joined with other countries with converging energy interests. This fact will be further commented in the paper's last part, but for now, linking energy policy coordination with the SCO, “we're talking [...] about the prospect of a gas market uniting Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and China” and “of an 'energy club' taking shape within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (Bhadrakumar, “Gas”).
The eventual full membership of Iran into the SCO is significant since it is “clear that Iran is a crucial node of a proposed Asian energy-security grid [that] would bypass Western - especially US - control of energy supplies and fuel in a real 21st-century industrial revolution all across Asia” (Escobar, “War”), which is obviously in the interest of both Russia and China. As for the place of Turkmen gas it this project, “following the death of former Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov on December 21, Moscow immediately moved to enhance its political influence in the gas-rich Central Asian country [and] appears to have rapidly gained the upper hand in a game that involves China, Iran, the European Union, and the United States.” China will also profit of growing Russian influence in Ashgabat “by striking a deal with Moscow” without risking “damaging its profitable positive relations with Moscow by abruptly stepping into Turkmenistan's post-Niyazov political game” (Bordonaro).
This nascent Sino-Russian partnership, the growing importance of the SCO and its consolidating control over Central Asian energy policy is deeply worrying political leaders in Washington. Nevertheless, the United States have still made significant incursions into Central Asian geopolitics.
The most pressing American goal in Central Asia is related to security and counter-terrorism. Even before September 11, the US already had close relations with Uzbekistan. The first US-Uzbek joint military exercises were held in 1997, and in 1998, the US Department of Defence secretly financed a low-level military cooperation program that involved military training, intelligence sharing and joint covert operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Daly et al. 68, Rumer 144). Washington also persuaded Uzbekistan to join the pro-Western GUUAM consultative forum.9
The United States' presence in the region was increased by its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, where Central Asia played a key logistical role (Olcott 332). From 2001 to 2002, US financial aid to Central Asian states doubled, passing from 242.6 to 586.9 US$ millions, but then dropped back to 294.8 US$ millions in 2003 (Boyer 104). Also, in 2002, the United States and Uzbekistan signed the “United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” (Rumer 145, Daly et al. 80).
The United States are especially concerned about potential political instability that can be caused by terrorism and radical Islamic groups like the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the internationally-active London-based Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT, Party of Liberation). Both are active in the poverty-stricken Fergana Valley (divided between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), a region a special worry for American counter-terrorism experts (Bhadrakumar, “Talibanization”, Escobar, “Peaceful”).
To reach this first goal, the United States intend to promote democratic and market economy reforms in Central Asia. For the US, “weak states, especially anocracies (that is, states that are neither clearly democratic nor authoritarian [like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan]), are inherently unstable and highly susceptible to failure” (Boyer 93). For that matter, Washington supported “Colour Revolutions” in post-Soviet states, through “democracy training” institutions like Freedom House and the National Endowment for Democracy.10 The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was the first to touch Central Asia.
Still, the main objective of democracy reforms is to displace the influence of Russia and contain the growth of China. New democratic leaders “likely would appreciate past U.S. support and perhaps move closer toward Western democracies and away from Russia and China, given the backing of those countries of the previous authoritarian regimes” (Weitz 161). At the same time, “US diplomacy is working toward getting Central Asian states to orientate toward South Asia,” which began by pressuring Afghanistan to refuse observer status into the SCO while becoming a full member of SAARC in 2007 (Bhadrakumar, “Into the fold”).11 In Washington's eyes, the presence of pro-Western regimes in Central Asia is essential for access and control of the crucial factor of 21st century geopolitics: energy resources.
From an American point of view, the landlocked dimension of Central Asia and the dependence on Russian-controlled supply routes has been a problem to solve since Western oil majors first arrived in the region. The answer was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Inaugurated in July 2006, after the project's initial conception in 1999, the BTC is the world's most expensive and second-longest pipeline. It runs through American-ally Azerbaijan and post-Rose Revolution Georgia (both GUAM members), proceeds around Russian-ally Armenia, passes near six ongoing or potential war zones, before ending at the Turkish port of Ceyhan, just besides the American airbase at Incirlik (Escobar, Globalistan 42-5). From the beginning, “the B.T.C. pipeline was designed to challenge Russian hegemony over energy in the Caspian Sea region” (Piskur). For that reason, it bypasses competing (but cheaper, safer and more practical) routes through Russia and Iran. Because the BTC “doesn’t make much sense in economic terms” (Escobar, Globalistan 46), or security terms for that matter, it is a perfect example of where the line between economics, security and geopolitics begin to blur in Central Asia.
In spite of the fact that “American influence [in Central Asia] has increased over the last several years” Boyer observes that “it is still very limited” due to the geopolitical context, the authoritarian nature of the local regimes, cultural norms and historical legacies that are very different from the West and the lack of structures favourable to the penetration of capitalism (97-100). This limited influence is perceivable in the counter-productive consequences of democracy promotion. Olcott remarks that “Washington has come to be viewed as the greater threat to the region's nondemocratic ruling elites, who fear that they are targets for ouster” (331), showing that “aggressive democracy promotion in Central Asia would likely both fail and harm U.S. interests” (Weitz, 161). In fact, “the lesson learned from the Colored Revolutions,” Rumer believes, “is that the United States is not a partner on whom [local leaders] will be able to rely as they confront the biggest political challenge since their rise to power: succession” (148-9).
In July 2005, the failure to understand those facts resulted in Tashkent (with SCO support) imposing a six-month deadline on the US to leave the Kashi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan. That was following “the United States' critical response to the Uzbek government's excessive use of force to suppress a violent uprising in the city of Andijon in May 2005”, which was “the final straw that broke the back of U.S.-Uzbek relations” (Rumer 141-2).
Also, the lack of an integrated framework under US leadership to combat terrorism has constrained the US to rely exclusively on bilateral relationships, therefore limiting region-wide cooperation. (Rumer 150). Some regimes have used that bilateral relationship in the “war on terror” by “exaggerating the terrorist threat” to justify “repressive measures” on their population (Boyer 101-2). Instead, the SCO has supplanted the US-led “war on terror” as the major counter-terrorism institution in the region, through the Tashkent-based RATS. That is why, “sensing that the SCO was gaining traction, Washington had sought observer status at its summit meeting last June [2006], but was turned down” (Bhadrakumar, “Into the Fold”).
At the energy level, the Russian counter-attack to the BTC pipeline did not make itself waiting with various projects that “frustrates the US attempt to dictate the primacy of the BTC as the key transportation route for Caspian oil to the Western market” which “deals a body blow to the BTC's expectations of attracting more quantities of Kazakh oil” (Bhadrakumar, “Dividing Line”). Also, Gazprom (Russia's gas giant) is rapidly consolidating its control on the gas industries in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Bordonaro, Escobar, Globalistan 49).
According to Atal, the United States' policy failures in Central Asia is creating “an anti-U.S. Chinese-Russian-Indian-Iranian axis [that] could undermine global counterterrorism cooperation, impede America's ability to effectively and rapidly respond to future threats in Central and South Asia, and reduce American access to Central Asian energy markets” (105). The possibility of such an anti-American axis taking place around the Sino-Russian strategic partnership spells out the fact that the lone superpower is unable to achieve its goals on its own, at least if it follows its current approach.
The balance of power in Central Asia shows that multipolarity is a reality in this region of the world. Russia and China, because of their several mutual interests, have chosen to collaborate in this new reality and Central Asian states tend to move closer to them even if Rumer believes that, unlike the US, “neither Russia nor China recognizes the need for long-term change in the region” (152). However, multipolarity can be verified, not only by observing a balance between major powers, but also by looking at how the weaker states are able to counter balance the influence of the three powers inside their own countries. For example, Central Asian states feel that “with the Chinese in the room, the Russians can't resort to their usual tricks” (Olcott 335). Or if we take the example of Kazakhstan who, in 2003, sent “a small group of 27 troops to Iraq to support the US-led effort after initially opposing the war.” That not only shows “the subtlety of Kazakhstan's foreign policy” and “a growing professionalism in the country's policy-making elite” (Olcott 332-3) but also highlights the very possibility for a smaller country the take a different position on world issues than its two bigger neighbours.
Cooperation between Russia and China is also beginning to be observable outside of Central Asia with “the expanding coordination between Russia and China at the UN; accelerating Chinese investments in Russia [and] Russia's increased readiness to transfer state-of-the-art weapon systems to China” (Bhadrakumar, “Orbit”). More significantly, Sino-Russian energy policy coordination is attracting other major producers and consumers. According to Stroupe, “we are witnessing not merely the formation of some new oil-and-gas cartel with Russia at its center, but rather the formation of something that includes both producers and the key consumer states of the East in an ever more cohesive de facto confederation” (Stroupe). This confederation “is cohesive and self-sufficient [and] supports preferred markets and customers and excludes the liberal West. Energy-based cross-investment between producer and consumer states cements the internal unity of the confederation” (Chaulia). This means a global energy confederation that unites Russia and Iran on the producer side with China and India on the consumer side, which is completely consistent with Atal's “anti-U.S. Chinese-Russian-Indian-Iranian axis” or with Bhadrakumar's SCO-controled “energy club”.
On the world stage, Russian and Chinese influence has considerably grown in regions where, until recently, American hegemony was unquestionable. For example, in Latin American, with Chavez' Venezuela and Morales' Bolivia, or in the Middle East, with growing military ties between Russia and American-ally Saudi Arabia. Sino-Russian influence is also perceivable in Africa, with strong military cooperation between Russia and Algeria, or economic and energy cooperation between China and various states like Angola, Sudan or Gabon (Engdahl). “Indeed, certain divisions of labor seem to have developed in dealing with regional [and world] issues, with Beijing opting for more of an economic role and Moscow emphasizing its military presence” (Bin).
It should now be clear, after the examination of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and the United States' limited capacity to exert its influence in Central Asia, that the unipolar world order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union is on the defencive. A new multipolar world order is now appearing through the cracks of American global hegemony, and the two biggest actors of this change are Russia and China.
As for Central Asia, the fact that it is the region where multipolar trends are the most easily observable is a statement of its new global importance. With this in mind, there are many future trends to watch out for in Central Asia. First, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is neither in the United States' interests, nor in Russia's or China's. Further failure from the US and NATO to bring stability and security to the country could persuade Russia and China to push for a larger role in Afghanistan that could maybe lead to a SCO military intervention either alone, or into a joint SCO-NATO operation. This could bring Afghanistan into the fold of the SCO, and thus spread Russian and Chinese influence. Secondly, the admission of new full members into the SCO could have major consequences, especially Iran, India and Pakistan. Apart from those three and Afghanistan, other countries could also be potential members, like Armenia, Mongolia and Turkmenistan. Lastly, further economic, political, and cultural integration of Central Asia, through post-Soviet organizations or the SCO, will increase Central Asia's ability to speak with one voice on the world stage to better defend its interests.
Through whatever vision we choose to look at geopolitics in Central Asia, either as the “New Great Game”, as the “War on Terror”, as Brzezinsky's “Grand Chessboard”, as Huntington's “Clash of Civilization's, or as Escobar's battle for the control of “Pipelineistan”, the geopolitical importance of Central Asia is unmistakable, because it is an herald of a new world order, an order where multipolarity reigns.12
1 The Washington-based neo-conservative think tank Project for a New American Century (PNAC) founded in 1997 advocates that the US maintain its global leadership in a “New American Century” (http://www.newamericancentury.org/). In his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama argues that the end of the Cold War announced the historical triumph of American-style liberal democracy. Fukuyama is also a member of PNAC.
2 The Great Game refers to the intense rivalry and competition for the control of Central Asia between the British and Russian Empires in the 19th century. Central Asia became the theatre of a subtle game of espionage, exploration, and open expansion that almost broke into open war. Many authors have used the parallel with today's context (Al-Sati 1-2, Atal 105, Bhadrakumar, “Great Game”, Brown, Swanström 569, Walsh 282), while others have disagreed with such a comparison (Olcott 331, Rumer 142, Weitz 156).
3 For more information on Central Asia, see Appendix 1 for history, Appendix 2 for maps, and Appendix 3 for general information.
4 For example, Russia has several federated Republics home to Turkic nationalities (like Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tatarstan and Tuva) and China has the predominantly Uighur region of Xinjiang. See Appendix 4 for maps of Xinjiang.
5 The European Union and Japan have only limited economic and diplomatic influence in Central Asia.
6 Following a policy of “positive neutrality”, Turkmenistan is just an observer state in the CIS, and is not a member of any other post-Soviet organization. The continuity of this policy is now uncertain following the death of former President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006.
7 On March 26, just as Chinese President Hu Jintao was arriving in Moscow for a official state visit, US computer-chip company Intel announced that it would build a US$2.5 billion semi-conductor plant in the Chinese city of Dalian.
8 Originally called the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), it became known as the SCO in 2001, after the inclusion of Uzbekistan. Mongolia received observer status in 2004, just like Iran, India and Pakistan in 2005. All except India have since applied for full membership. Belarus has also sought observer status. Again, Turkmenistan is not a member. For a view of the geographical extent of the SCO, see Appendix 5.
9 The GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) consultative forum was conceived as a way to counter Russian influence in Western-leaning CIS countries. However, Uzbekistan withdrew in 2002, shortly after joining the SCO, and the group was renamed GUAM. In 2006, in became known as the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.
10 Colour Revolutions refer to the events that brought pro-Western governments in post-Soviet or post-communist countries. They include the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, to which some add the 2000 Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia and 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon.
11 SAARC is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The US Department of State combines Central and South Asia into the same bureau (US Department of State).
12 Zbigniew Brzezinsky points out Central Asia's geopolitical importance for the US in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard. Samuel P. Huntington sees Central Asia as a region of clashing civilizations/religions in his 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. Pepe Escobar has characterized geopolitics in Central Asia as a competition for the control of a virtual geopolitical entity named “Pipelineistan” that transcends sovereign states (Globalistan). For further information on geopolitics in Central Asia as well as links to various websites and articles, see Vincent's WCII blog at <http://vincentwcii.blogspot.com/>.
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Appendix 1. Short Time-Line of the History of Central Asia
1907: The Anglo-Russian Convention in Saint-Petersburg officially ends the “Great Game” and affirms Russian domination in most of Central Asia (named at the time West Turkestan).
1925-1936: The Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR), shaping the borders of the actual modern Central Asian states, are set up by Josef Stalin.
1933: The First East Turkestan Republic is declared but destroyed by Soviet troops and reintegrated into the Republic of China.
1944-1949: The Second East Turkestan Republic is established, this time with Soviet backing, before being abolished and integrated into the new People's Republic of China. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is created in 1955.
1991: The five former Central Asian SSR become independent, non-communist states.
1992-1997: The Tajik Civil War between secular and islamist factions allows Russia to intervene and keep an important influence in Tajikistan.
2001: The Shanghai Five becomes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after the inclusion of Uzbekistan.
2001: After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States invade Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime. Several military bases are opened in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrghyzstan.
2005: The US-backed “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrghyzstan brings to power a more American leaning government, alarming Russia, China and Central Asian authoritarian leaders.
2005: The Uzbek government demands the United-States to leave the Kashi-Khanabad airbase, after Washington criticized the killings in Adijon.
2006: The strategically important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is completed, opening a path from Central Asia to European energy markets bypassing both Russia and Iran.Appendix
2. Political Maps of Central Asia
Source: University of Washington, <http://depts.washington.edu/caict/images/map.gif>.
2.1 Political map limited to the five former SSR.
2.2 Cultural definition of Central Asia, as defined by UNESCO.
Source: Wikipedia, Central Asia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_asia>.
Appendix 3. General Information on the Five Central Asian States
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html> and Boyer, 2006 (96).
Kazakhstan
Capital: Astana (largest city is Almaty)
Area: 2,724,900 km2
Population: 15,2 millions
Main languages: Kazakh (Turkic, 64%), Russian (Slavic, 23% [95% in everyday business])
Religion: Sunni Islam (47%), Russian Orthodox (44%)
Government: Republic; single-dominant, multi-party parliament
Head of State: President Nursultant Nazarbayev
GDP (US$ billions): 29.7
Main economic sectors: Energy (gas, oil), minerals (uranium), agriculture
Human rights: Poor; limited free press, limited political opposition
Kyrghyzstan
Capital: Bishkek
Area: 199,900 km2
Population: 5,3 millions
Main languages: Kirghiz (Turkic, 79%), Russian (Slavic, 12%)
Religion: Sunni Islam (75%), Russian Orthodox (20%)
Government: Republic; single-dominant, multi-party parliament
Head of State: President Kurmanbek Bakiyev
GDP (US$ billions): 1.9
Main economic sectors: Agriculture, minerals (gold)
Human rights: Poor; limited free press, limited political opposition
Tajikistan
Capital: Dushanbe
Area: 143,100 km2
Population: 7,3 millions
Main language: Tajiki Persian (Iranian, 80%)
Religion: Sunni Islam (85%)
Government: Republic; single-dominant, multi-party parliament
Head of State: President Emomali Rahmonov
GDP (US$ billions): 1.4
Main economic sectors: Agriculture (cotton), minerals (aluminium)
Human rights: Poor; limited free press, limited political opposition
Turkmenistan
Capital: Ashgabat
Area: 2,724,900 km2
Population: 5,1 millions
Main language: Turkmen (Turkic, 72%)
Religion: Sunni Islam (89%)
Government: Presidential Republic; single-party parliament
Head of State: President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow (after the death of former President for Life Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006)
GDP (US$ billions): 6.2
Main economic sectors: Energy (gas), textiles, agriculture (cotton)
Human rights: Very poor; no free press, no political opposition
Uzbekistan
Capital: Tashkent
Area: 447,400 km2
Population: 26,6 millions
Main language: Uzbek (Turkic, 80%)
Religion: Sunni Islam (88%)
Government: Republic; multi-party parliament
Head of State: President Islom Karimov
GDP (US$ billions): 9.9
Main economic sectors: Agriculture (cotton), minerals (gold), textiles, energy (gas)
Human rights: Very poor; no free press, no political opposition
Appendix 4. Maps of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
4.1 Map showing the location of Xinjiang in China
Source: Wikipedia, Xinjiang, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang>.
4.2 Map showing Xinjiang and the neighbouring countries.
Source: Amnesty International, <http://www.amnesty.org/images/resources/china/xuar.gif>.
Appendix 5. Map of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Source: Wikipedia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization>.
(Members in blue, observers in medium green)
